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Recent Cases
POST CoNvicrioN REiEDY-HABEAs CORPUs-KENTUCKY RULE OF CEUM-
iNAL I ocEDuRE 11.42-Appellant petitioned for a writ of habeas
corpus, principally on the ground that his constitutional rights had
been violated because his court-appointed counsel had an adverse
interest in the proceeding and had failed to represent him effectively
in presenting his defense. Appellant chose the habeas corpus proceed-
ing although he also had a remedy under Kentucky Rule of Criminal
Procedure 11.42 [hereinafter cited as RCr]. From a dismissal of the
petition on the ground that it failed to state facts upon which relief
could be granted, the petitioner appealed. Held: Affirmed. Justice
Montgomery dissented.' The petition for habeas corpus was properly
dismissed where there was no showing that the remedy by motion to
vacate or correct the sentence was inadequate to test the legality of
the petitioner's detention. Ayers v. Davis, 877 S.W.2d 154 (Ky. 1964).
As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not be granted
where there is another adequate remedy.2 A Kentucky case, decided
in 1937, held that a writ of habeas corpus will issue where the
imprisonment is illegal and no other remedy is available to secure
release.3 A later Kentucky case held that the use of the writ of habeas
corpus should be restricted within narrow limits, and the procedure
to obtain a new trial after judgment, valid on its face, should be by
direct application to the court which rendered judgment, rather than
by resort to habeas corpus.4 Previously, even though another remedy
existed, it was not necessarily exclusive. In light of these decisions, the
holding of the court of appeals in Ayers was a logical, and by no
means surprising, step forward.
RCr 11.42 combined with RCr 10.06 is designed to replace the writ
of coram nobis.5 A more precise description would be that the coram
nobis remedy is incorporated into the rules, since the relief prescribed
is much broader. Rice v. Davis6 expanded the traditional role of
habeas corpus relief to include as grounds radical irregularities other
than the lack of jurisdiction of the offense or person. The Ayers
decision not only made RCr 11.42 the exclusive remedy in this area,
IAyers v. Davis, 377 S.W.2d 878 (Ky. 1964).
239 C.J.S. Habeas Corpus § 7 (1936).
3 Jones v. Commonwealth, 269 Ky. 772, 108 S.W.2d 812 (1937).
4 Sharpe v. Commonwealth, 292 Ky. 86, 165 S.W.2d 993 (1942).
G RCr 11.42, explanatory comment (1962).
6 366 S.W.2d 153 (Ky. 1963).
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but also incorporated the broadened habeas corpus remedy of Rice
within its scope.
In Ayers, the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that RCr 11.42 is
similar to relief provided federal prisoners by 28 U.S.C.A. section 2255,
and that the purpose of the rule plainly implies that the remedy
precludes habeas corpus unless it is not adequate, as is stated
expressly in section 2255. Thus, it is clear that RCr 11.42, as
interpreted in Ayers, provides a post conviction review procedure
which is consistent with federal standards. The rule was designed
to be in conformity with federal standards and recent Supreme Court
pronouncements.7 Thus, the Ayers decision was not unwarranted.
RCr 11.42 provides for a direct attack upon any conviction which
would otherwise be subject to a collateral attack.8 An RCr 11.42
motion is a resumption or continuation of the criminal proceeding on
which the movant is entitled to appointed counsel upon a showing
that he is financially unable to employ one. Since the motion is in the
same court wherein the conviction was rendered, the records are
available. A habeas corpus action, on the other hand, is essentially
civil in nature.9 More often than not, it is brought in a different court
from the one in which the judgment under attack was rendered.
Hence, neither the records nor the witnesses are readily available,
and the state is not obliged to furnish an indigent prisoner a copy of
the record or to appoint counsel. These factors prompted the court in
Ayers to proclaim that: "RCr 11.42 is intended to provide a more
satisfactory form of remedy for this type of case than is practicable
under habeas corpus." 0
In Hobbs v. Stivers," decided after the Ayers case, the court of
appeals denied a petition for a writ of mandamus on the ground that
the petition disclosed on its face that ultimately the relief sought
would prove fruitless. The court reasoned as follows:
Should we direct the respondent to pass on petitioner's motion it would
be incumbent on him to overrule it. Petitioner's only recourse then
would be an appeal to this court. To obviate such useless circuity of
motion it is preferable that we say now what would eventually have to
be said anyway.' 2
One week after the Hobbs decision the court ruled upon a habeas
corpus petition in Langdon v. Thomas13 and used the Hobbs case as
7 RCr 11.42, explanatory comment (1962).8 Tipton v. Commonwealth, 376 S.W.2d 290 (Ky. 1964).
9 Crady v. Cranfill, 371 S.W.2d 640 (Ky. 1963).
10 377 S.W.2d at 154; see also, Tipton v. Commonwvealth, 376 S.W.2d. 290
(Ky. 1964); Higbee v. Thomas, 376 S.W.2d 305 (Ky. 1963).
"8185 S.W.2d 76 (Ky. 1964).
12 Id. at 77.
13 ?84 S.W.2d 508 (Ky. 1964).
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precedent. The court reviewed the merits of the habeas corpus
petition and affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the petition. The
court reviewed the merits of the petition in order to eliminate the
circuity of action that would have occurred had the court simply held
that the petitioner's exclusive remedy was under RCr 11.42. Had the
court so held, the petitioner's sole recourse would then have been to
resort to RCr 11.42 to present the same question which was then
before the court. Since the grounds set forth in the petition were not
sufficient to justify relief from the judgment by habeas corpus or under
RCr 11.42, the court, under the authority of Hobbs, considered the
merits of the petition and affirmed the dismissal on that basis.
Kentucky has taken two important steps forward in 1964 in the
area of post conviction remedy. The first was the holding in Ayers
that RCr 11.42 is exclusive in the absence of a showing that it is
inadequate. The second was the holding in Langdon, which qualified
the Ayers decision by incorporating the Hobbs decision within its
scope. The Kentucky rule, in light of these decisions, is that where
the validity of a petitioner's imprisonment can be tested by a motion
to vacate judgment, filed pursuant to RCr 11.42, such procedure is
exclusive. However, if the allegation in the petition for habeas corpus
is taken as true, and such allegation does not render the original
judgment void, the court wvill not only affirm the necessity of pro-
ceeding pursuant to RCr 11.42, but will also negatively dispose of the
merits of the allegation just as if it had arisen on appeal from a denial
of a motion to vacate judgment.
Ralph R. Kinney
TRADE REGULATION-SALE BELow COST-EVIDENCE OF INTENT.-Plaintiff
laundry brought an action against defendant laundry for alleged
violation of Ky. Rev. Stat. 865.030(1) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
Defendant's salesmen, in efforts to expand the firm's linen rental
service among motels and nursing homes, solicited some of plaintiff's
regular customers by offering two weeks' free service. Plaintiff does
ordinary laundry and dry cleaning only. Two of the customers
switched to defendant, thus causing plaintiff to lose accounts totaling
some 160 dollars per week. Defendant admitted giving the free
service and, strictly as a conciliatory gesture, promised to cease this
practice. The trial court, on the basis of pre-trial depositions, opening
statements of counsel, and the testimony of plaintiff's president,
entered a summary judgment for defendant after agreement that no
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